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A psychiatrist who designates behavior as dis-
ordered, deviant, or sick and identifies the ante-
cedent social conditions of such behavior 'as
stressful, dtsorganized, or disintegrated neces-
sarily and properly makes value judgments.
However considered, sympathetic, well-inten-
tioned, and technically couched his opinions may
be, he judges some behavior and its attendant
circumstances to be less desirable than others.
Whether a clinical psychiatrist asks himself in
which readymade disease category the symptoms
fit or, in the manner of the existential psychia-
trist, he attempts to understand the behavior
from the patient's inner world-that is, deals
with the situation the patient confronts and the
goals toward which 1.J.e is striving - the psychia-
trist sees something undesirable in the goals
which the other person pursues. Or else, he
sees the patient's means of striving, the inordi-
nately great or miniscule amount of energy he
expends in adaptation, his emotionally inappro-
priate tone of behavior, or the character of his
relationship with other people to be somehow
wrong. Just as the law sees a lawbreaker
deviating from legal norms, the psychiatrist
, views his patient to be deviant with respect to
some ideal pattern which may be left unvoiced
or inexplicit. My object is not to question the
propriety of such professional judgments but to
determine what might be called their social basis
and to call attention to certain consequences that
follow.
*A considerably longer version of this paper was pre-
pared for the University of Kentucky Centennial Confer-
ence on Cross-cultural Psychiatry and Psychoethnology.
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Psychiatric judgments are value judgments
made by some members of a class-dtvtded
society about other members. In our highly
diversified social system, psychiatrists are
primarily rooted in one sociocultural segment,
which I will take the liberty of calling the
middle-class (or middle-class culture). More
specificall:r, the psychiatrist embodies a pro-
fessional variant of American middle-class
culture. I don't mean that the social classes
possess relatively self-contained, total cultures.
They are subcultures or, even more precisely,
they are distinguished by cultural specialties, and
alternatives which, taken together with our cul-
tural universals, make up 'the United States,
culturally speaking. The psychiatrist's ability to
make value judgments authoritatively about his
fellow citizen's activities - to make them stick-
occurs by virtue of his professional status which
confers on him power over the person whom he
diagnoses. Note one consequence that follows.
The psychiatrist possesses power to implement
certain values and standards (namely his own)
over other, competing values and standards that
he has reason to regard as dangerous to the
patient or for society.
Anyone who makes expert judgments - man-
agement consultants, economists, engineers, or
TV repairmen - always occupies a particular
position in a structure of unequal knowledge and
values. The expert has a vested interest in a
given set of norms or in a special way of life.
Equally so, a psychiatrist. He speaks from a
special vantage point when he appraises homo-
sexuality, extreme suspiciousness, or dread as
sick or undesirable. Now, the question I wish to
concentrate on is this: do not the psychiatrist's
values and diagnostic judgments sometimes
represent behavior norms that stem fr~m his
social-class position? If, as to me seems likely,
they do embody class-bound behavioral values-
call them middle-class values for brevity's
sake - then when he deals withpatients of another,
especially lower, social class isn't he judging
another way of life by comparing it unfavorably
with his own? As a result, lower-rankingpeople
are more often likely to impress him withpoorer
mental health than people who act according to
his own norms.
If my hypothesis holds true, it offers one but
not the only reason why in large-scale epidemio-
logical surveys lower class respondents tend to
cluster toward the seriously impaired end of the
mental health spectrum. For example, findings
of the Midtown Manhattan Study'. indicate that
mental health between three socioeconomic
levels - high, middle, and low - varies much more
than might be expected. In operational terms,
persons of low socioeconomic status risk coming
through a psychiatric screening with worse men-
tal health ratings than persons of middle or high
status who have experienced the same, measured
amount of lifetime stress. Stress scores do
climb from high socioeconomic status to low,
but mental health risk increases still faster.
Why do respondents of low socioeconomic status
come through psychiatric screening with worse
mental health? One reason may be that high
status people react to stress in predominantly
neurotic fashion, becoming nervous, restless,
obsessionally worried, and so on. They become
mentally ill in ways that are tightly controlled
and therefore consistent with their middle- and
upper-class values. People of low socioeconomic
status, on the other hand, respond to stress in
ways compatible with their isolation, passivity,
dependence, mistrust, and social inadequacy.
Their symptoms exaggerate, or at least utilize,
the class-bound behavior patterns that they also
reveal in normal situations. But why should
lower-class ways of getting sick be worse than
middle-class ways of getting sick? Middle-
class-bound psychiatrists judge them so. In their
screening they ~ore frequently give the inter-
views of respondents of relatively low socio-
economic status worse mental-health ratings
than they assigned to subjects of higher rank.
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By the standards of their profession they
undoubtedly felt fully justified in evaluating them
as worse off, but the fact remains that they
evaluated lower-class modes of adaptation as
worse than middle- and upper-class modes and
so discovered that mental health fares worse as
one goes down the social-class ladder. Nodoubt
it was worse - according to the standards that the
psychiatrists used. I suggest that those standards
were contaminated by the evaluator's own class-
bound values to a degree. I suspect that his
values blocked him from obtaining a fuller, if
not truer, view of the people whom he [udged.'
When psychiatrists include their class-bound
values in evaluatingpersonality disorder, people
who show strain by acting out or falling to
pieces emotionally and cognitively, as lower-
class people predominantly do, must be judged
as worse off than people who feel unworthy or
who constantly visit the doctor with difficult
stomachs.
To the value judgments that a clinical psychia-
trist makes when he designates a person's
behavior as disordered, the social psychiatrist
adds professionally informed value judgments
that cover the patient's social setting. The stress
concept or some analogous notion provides the
bridge which connects personality disorder to
etiologically significant, antecedent social con-
o ditions. When used in a psychological sense,
stress and its counterpart, strain, are applied
figuratively or analogically to the meaning they
hold in engineering. Poverty, broken homes, a
person's failure to achieve vital goals, cognitive
dissonance, and many more experiences are
figuratively conceived as acting like physical
forces which wear down physical materials.
Stress is certainly ubiquitous in human life but
social scientists believe that it inheres much
more heavily in some sectors of social space-
especially in some strata of a stratified commu-
nity - than in others. The Midtown Study's recent
attempt to test this hypothesis by measuring
stress objectively led to interesting results. 3
The study inquired about and. counted such
stressors as poor physical health in childhood,
broken homes, economic deprivation in child-
hood, current worry about work or about socio-
economic status and marital worries. Note that
the designers of this research not only assumed
stress to be objectively identifiable but also that
it could be quantified. Some 1600 carefully
selected Manhattan adults each received a stress
score based on factors in his life like those I
just mentioned, including whether he worried
about work, overwork, getting ahead, and the
cost of living, and whether he enjoyed only few
or no social affiliations with neighbors, close
friends. or co-members in organizations. How
surprised the investigators were to learn that
stress scores didn't vary much between high.
middle, and low social strata. People of low
socioeconomic status scored an average of 5.7;
in middle strata they scored a 5.3 average, and
in higher levels, 4.7 .. By the social psychiatrists'
own admission, they had probably over-estima-
ted exposure to stress in lower socioeconomic
levels.
This discovery suggests that middle-class
social psychiatrists exaggerate the stressful
components .of lower-class life. To be sure the
poor suffer from bad housing, frequent aggress-
ion, illness, and many kinds of failure, exploita-
tion, and victimization. They do so to such an
extent that these are earmarks of the culture of
poverty. But they are undoubtedly not the sole
properties of that culture. What in fact do
middle-class people really know about the
culture of poverty? Practically all the socio-
logically and a.nthropologically derived informa-
tion we possess exudes a class-bound bias and
probably seriously distorts that many-faceted
culture by abstracting only its misery. Balanced
accounts, like The Urban Villagers by Herbert
J. Gans which I" would exempt from my general-
ization, are all too rare. As Margaret Mead
once said, the social sciences following the lead
of psychiatry prefer to listen almost solely for
distortion. 4 They do so with both ears, paying
practically no heed to cultural patterns and
social arrangements that might compensate
people for their undeniably harsh phases of
existence. In their biased approach, social
scientists sertously overlook possibilities for
new learning. By emphasizing only one side of
the culture of poverty, they block off unexpected
discoveries of new facts.
Returning to the Midtown Study and its attempt
to measure stress objectively in high, middle,
"and low socioeconomic strata, can such a pro-
.cedure be sound when the indicators of stress
have been subjectively determined by middle-
class observers? Furthermore, if the same
observers judge the culture of poverty by their
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own deeply cherished, olass-bound standards,
can they ever see much more than predominant
misery, squalor, and other deplorable traits?
The facts in such cases may not mean the same
thing to the actors and the persons doing the
study. The very variables an' investigator se-
lects, like little communtcatton in the home,
mutual misunderstanding, and lack of together-
ness in the family, betray his values.
Social psychiatrists confront a problem that
belongs to every other social science discipline
as well. How can we learn better to understand
significantly different people and communities
without imposing too much of ourselves on the
material we wish to comprehend? To resolve
that problem better requires utilizing a maxi-
mum of the structure that, as Sapir puts it, is
inherent in the data being observed. 5 This doesn't
mean letting an inhabitant of the culture of
poverty dictate his own etlmography•.The result
would also be highly biased. What is called for
is stretching and improving our methods to
incorporate the inhabitant's experience and
pattern of life as fully and fairly as possible.
Descriptive analyses of society or personality
can never pretend to be faithful mirrorings of
external reality nor should they be regarded as
direct translations of one realm of experience
into another. Psychiatric views of the culture of
poverty, like any formulation of individual
personality or culture history, represent a
dialectic resolution of a state of tension that.
has been generated between the observer and
the material he seeks to understand. Adescrip-
tion or analysis is a tentative synthesis of that
tension, a temporary resolution of a prolonged
state of opposition. The tension may return as
soon as the observer or others disagree with the "
formulation, either because new facts have come
to light or fresh concepts have been coined that
render the existing account unsatisfactory and
nolonger tenable. In criticizing the class-bound,
ethnocentric value judgments of psychiatry I
don't offer as a substitute some certain path to
fully objective. immutable truth. Truth in psy-
chiatry and the other disciplines that study
hwnan behavior consists of a relatively stable
equilibrium that has been established between
an observer and his colleagues after he has
succeeded in resolving to his own satisfaction
the tension that existed between himself and the
subject matter he sought to understand.
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